European Observatory to Combat Radicalization – EOCR
Counter Extremism Project. Afghanistan Terrorism Report: July 2023
ctinsight – The following is the July 2023 instalment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and ISIS-K propaganda.
In July, ISIS-K and pro-ISIS propaganda outlets continued to highlight only terrorist attacks of symbolic importance. In addition to mentioning an ISIS-K attack on a patrol of the Taliban in Kunar province and the execution of an alleged “spy” of the Taliban, pro-ISIS outlets highlighted a series of assassinations of Taliban officials, such as Sayed Azim Agha, the head of the foreign relations department of the Taliban Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled Affairs and the alleged killing of Mullah Yakoob Omari. According to pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets, Omari was an intelligence official of the Taliban in Kunduz.
The attack most prominently discussed in ISIS-K linked propaganda outlets was the suicide attack on the gathering of the Pakistani political party Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI-F) in the town of Khar, in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan on July 30th. This attack killed at least 54 people and wounded at least 200. Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI-F) is a Deobandi Islamist political party in Pakistan and ideologically close to the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. The party leader, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, was reportedly involved in organizing the early Taliban movement.
This attack on a political gathering drew international condemnation, including by the United Nations Security Council. Both the Afghan Taliban as well as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) condemned the attack. Interestingly, even al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) issued a statement criticizing the attack. AQIS was formed in 2014 and serves as the regional affiliate of the global al-Qaeda network. While maintaining propaganda machinery, AQIS rarely issues statements concerning events in the region, and the fact that the group commented on this attack can be seen as another indication of the ongoing symbiotic relationship between the Taliban and the al-Qaeda network.
In what could be interpreted as a sign of ISIS-K’s weakening position in the north of Afghanistan, ISIS-K-linked outlets carried a plea by the group to the people of the Panshir Valley to join them in their resistance to the Taliban. Panshir Valley is the last remaining area of operations of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF), which brings together fighters who continue to be loyal to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. As highlighted in the previous report, the Taliban are engaged in an increasingly violent campaign against the NRF. Therefore, this is an apparent attempt of ISIS-K to take advantage of this situation and expand its social support base in the area.
Of course, ISIS-K-linked and pro-ISIS propaganda outlets continued their ideological attacks against the Taliban regime. In July, Afghan Shiites celebrated Ashura with religious processions in Afghanistan. Pro-ISIS outlets repeatedly mocked the Taliban, claiming that they were religious deviants for not preventing the celebration of these Shiite religious festivals. Indeed, the Taliban regime allowed these religious celebrations to go ahead but placed a number of restrictions on them, citing security reasons.
A second issue highlighted in pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets in July was the developing commercial relationship between the Taliban regime and China. Indeed, as claimed by pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets, there are multiple media reports that the Haqqani-led Taliban Ministry of Interior Affairs has agreed with Chinese company Huawei to install security cameras to increase domestic security. Furthermore, at the beginning of July, the Taliban regime announced that it had begun extracting oil in Afghanistan’s northern Sar-e Pol province, reportedly through a contract with a Chinese company. In January 2023, the Taliban regime signed a contract with Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co (CAPEIC) for this project.
In an apparent attempt to give the impression that the Chinese are slowly taking over Afghanistan, pro-ISIS-K propaganda posts repeatedly emphasized a video that allegedly shows Chinese women cycling in Kabul without headscarves. These propaganda posts argued that while the Taliban oppress Afghan women, they let foreign women violate even basic Islamic clothing requirements. Indeed, the United Nations Assistance Mission In Afghanistan (UNAMA), in the July update of its regular human rights reporting, highlighted increasing restrictions on Afghan women and girls, such as the decision of the Taliban regime in May that only males would be allowed to attend the entrance exam for specialized medical training.
Finally, pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets picked up on the meeting between U.S. officials and the Taliban in Qatar. At the end of July, Thomas West, special representative for Afghanistan; Rina Amiri, special envoy for Afghan women; and Karen Decker, chief of the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan based in Doha, met with a delegation led by Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. This was the first official bilateral meeting since the Taliban took over power by force in Afghanistan in August 2021.
The spokesman of the Taliban foreign ministry, Abdul Qahar Balkhi, claimed after the meeting that, among other issues, both sides had discussed the removal of sanctions, a topic that was not confirmed by the official readout from the U.S. side. Of course, pro-ISIS-K propaganda outlets used this meeting to argue that the Taliban regime has become a client of the U.S., particularly since during the meeting, the Taliban restated their commitment that Afghanistan will not be used to attack the U.S. or its allies.
Demonstrating the increasing role that ISIS affiliates in West Africa play for this terror network, ISIS-K Voice of Khorasan web magazine headlined its 27th issue at the end of July with an article on ISIS operations in that region. The article highlights the increasing difficulties of international and United Nations forces caused by the military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso and highlights that the coup in Niger will result in a further withdrawal of international forces.
The article claims that ISIS has many supporters, and its operations are successful, including inflicting casualties on al-Qaeda. Indeed, the operational areas of the two ISIS affiliates in the region, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS), continue to increase in the region. Since March 2022, ISGS has renamed itself to Islamic State Sahel Province, an elevation from an ISIS-affiliated group to an ISIS “province” status. Its fighters now regularly clash with forces belonging to Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the coalition of al-Qaeda-linked groups in the region.
